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Abstract—Threat actors are constantly seeking new attack
surfaces, with ransomeware being one the most successful at-
tack vectors that have been used for financial gain. This has
been achieved through the dispersion of unlimited polymorphic
samples of ransomware whilst those responsible evade detection
and hide their identity. Nonetheless, every ransomware threat
actor adopts some similar style or uses some common patterns
in their malicious code writing, which can be significant evidence
contributing to their identification. The first step in attempting
to identify the source of the attack is to cluster a large number
of ransomware samples based on very little or no information
about the samples, accordingly, their traits and signatures can
be analysed and identified. Therefore, this paper proposes an
efficient fuzzy analysis approach to cluster ransomware samples
based on the combination of two fuzzy techniques fuzzy hashing
and fuzzy c-means (FCM) clustering. Unlike other clustering
techniques, FCM can directly utilise similarity scores generated
by a fuzzy hashing method and cluster them into similar
groups without requiring additional transformational steps to
obtain distance among objects for clustering. Thus, it reduces
the computational overheads by utilising fuzzy similarity scores
obtained at the time of initial triaging of whether the sample
is known or unknown ransomware. The performance of the
proposed fuzzy method is compared against k-means clustering
and the two fuzzy hashing methods SSDEEP and SDHASH
which are evaluated based on their FCM clustering results to
understand how the similarity score affects the clustering results.
Index Terms—Ransomware; Similarity Preserving; Fuzzy
Hashing; SSDEEP; SDHASH; Fuzzy C-means Clustering; FCM;
WannaCry; WannaCryptor; Locky; Cerber; CryptoWall; Triag-
ing; Context-Triggered Piecewise Hashing; CTPH.
I. INTRODUCTION
Ransomware threat actors are using ransomware as a
weapon to attack cyber infrastructure and exploit users fi-
nancially. They conceal their identity by dispersing multiple
polymorphic instances of ransomware, thereby presenting an
advanced persistent threat [1], [2]. There are several cate-
gories of ransomware, which pose a severe threat such as
WannaCry/WannaCryptor, Locky, Cerber, CryptoWall, Petya,
Notpetya, GandCrab, Bad Rabbit and CryptoLocker [2], [3],
[4]. However, every ransomware threat actor adopts some
similar style or uses some common patterns in their malicious
code writing [2]; therefore, through the use of classification or
clustering techniques, these ransomware threat actors/groups
or new ransomware families can be discovered, based on the
information mined from the particular corpus of ransomware
[5]. However, the success of any classification or clustering is
dependent on the chosen metric for calculating the similarity
distance or score amongst the objects [6]. As presented in
[7], fuzzy hashing (in particular SDHASH) yielded superior
triaging results for various ransomware corpora, therefore, this
can be considered as a preferred similarity metric for any
classification or clustering method.
Normally, most malware (here ransomware) corpus comes
with unlabelled or generic labels (mostly mislabelled) [8].
However, the correct classification of any corpus requires
precise labels and characteristics, which can be difficult to
achieve due to the lack of a globally accepted ground truth
[9]. Consequently, it is useful to cluster similar samples within
the corpus as a pre-processing step for any advanced analysis
or to improve the classification accuracy [10]. Therefore,
this paper proposes an efficient fuzzy analysis approach to
cluster ransomware, based on the combination of two fuzzy
techniques: a fuzzy hashing method [11], [12] and fuzzy c-
means (FCM) clustering method [13], [14], [15], [16]. This
combination of two fuzzy methods reduces the computational
overheads by utilising fuzzy similarity scores obtained at the
time of initial triaging of whether the sample is known or
unknown ransomware.
As this is the first time, the combination of fuzzy hashing
and fuzzy c-means clustering methods are used together for
ransomware clustering, naturally, it is compared with the
most common k-means clustering method to determine the
clustering performance of the proposed FCM based fuzzy anal-
ysis approach. Furthermore, the two fuzzy hashing methods
SSDEEP and SDHASH are evaluated based on their FCM
clustering results to understand how the similarity score affects
the clustering results. Evaluating the clustering results is a
challenging task due to different perspectives and the unavail-
ability of standard labels. Thus, for the rigorous comparison,
four evaluation metrics (particularly for FCM) Fuzzy Silhou-
ette Index, Partition Coefficient, Modified Partition Coefficient
and Partition Entropy are calculated and compared for both
SSDEEP and SDHASH based FCM clustering method.
The background information and data collection process is
already explained in the first part of the paper [7]. The rest
of the paper is divided into the following sections: Section II
presents the proposed fuzzy analysis approach for the analysis
of ransomware corpus. Section III presents the experimental
evaluation of FCM clustering and k-means clustering results.
Section IV presents the experimental evaluation of SSDEEP
and SDHASH based FCM clustering results. Finally, Section
V concludes the paper with the possible future enhancement.
II. PROPOSED FUZZY ANALYSIS APPROACH FOR
RANSOMWARE
The proposed fuzzy analysis approach to cluster ran-
somware is based on the combination of two fuzzy techniques:
a fuzzy hashing method [11], [12] and FCM clustering method
[13], [14], [15], [16], in which any fuzzy hashing method and
any variation of FCM can be employed. Furthermore, as a
pre-processing step - unpacking the ransomware corpus may
or may not require the use of an unpacking tool depend-
ing on whether the ransomware corpus is already unpacked
or not, which is normally the preliminary requirement for
most of malware analysis [17], [18], [19], [20]. Examining
thousands of samples of ransomware families, they exhibit
various degrees of similarity with each other and identifying
their degree of similarity using a fuzzy hashing method would
be beneficial for clustering and directly placing into similar
(classification) groups albeit with little information available.
Unlike other clustering techniques, FCM can directly utilise
similarity scores generated by a fuzzy hashing method and
cluster them into similar groups without requiring an addi-
tional transformational step to obtain distance amongst objects
for clustering. Thus, it reduces the computational overheads
by utilising fuzzy similarity scores obtained at the time of
initial triaging whether the sample is known or unknown
ransomware. Moreover, a fuzzy hashing method performs
two tasks grouping the samples into known and unknown
categories and assigning the fuzzy similarity score to the
known samples in the range of 0 to 1 (or 0 to 100%), later
this value is directly utilised as the degree of membership
for the FCM process and used to expedite the clustering
operation. Most fuzzy hashes are compact in size, which can
save memory and other computational resources in comparison
to other analysis methods.
The initial triaging results of four ransomware corpora
using SSDEEP and SDHASH fuzzy hashing methods are the
basis of FCM clustering which were analysed in the first
part of the paper [7]. The employed dataset of 200 samples
of four categories of ransomware WannaCry, Locky, Cerber
and CryptoWall with 50 samples of each was collected from
two sources Hybrid Analysis [21] and Malshare [22]. The
verification of samples and their further analysis is performed
Fig. 1. Fuzzy Analysis Approach for the analysis of Ransomware Corpus
based on the information obtained from VirusTotal [23] and
mostly based on the discretion of authors [24], [25], [26], [27].
III. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION OF FUZZY C-MEANS
CLUSTERING AND K-MEANS CLUTERING RESULTS
Evaluating the performance of FCM clustering, based on
SSDEEP and SDHASH fuzzy similarity scores, its clustering
results were compared with k-means clustering utilising the
same SSDEEP and SDHASH fuzzy similarity scores. This
assessment was based on the measurement of the internal accu-
racy of clusters by employing the Silhouette Coefficient which
is commonly used for the evaluation a clustering method.
The average Silhouette Coefficient was computed utilising
Euclidean Distance for both FCM and k-means clustering
methods, where the greater value of Silhouette Coefficient
represents more accurate clustering results. Both k-means [28]
and FCM [29] clustering methods are implemented in R.
A. Comparative Evaluation of FCM Clustering and K-Means
Clustering based on SSDEEP Similarity Scores
In the first evaluation, all the four SSDEEP results of Wan-
naCry, Locky, Cerber and CryptoWall ransomware [7] were
utilised for both FCM and k-means clustering methods. The
average Silhouette Coefficient was computed for the range of
clusters from 2 to 7 checking the consistency in performance
of FCM and k-means clustering methods. The comparative
results of the average Silhouette Coefficient based on SSDEEP
similarity scores for the four ransomware categories are shown
in Table I. Overall, for the four ransomware categories, FCM
clustering generated improved clustering results in comparison
to k-means clustering with only a few exceptions. This reflects
the natural alignment of the two fuzzy methods utilised
together.
B. Comparative Evaluation of FCM Clustering and K-Means
Clustering based on SDHASH Similarity Scores
In the second evaluation, all four SDHASH results of
WannaCry, Locky, Cerber and CryptoWall ransomware [7]
were utilised for both FCM and k-means clustering methods.
Similarly, the average Silhouette Coefficient was computed
for the same range of clusters from 2 to 7 checking the
consistency in performance of FCM and k-means clustering
methods. The comparative results of the average Silhouette
Coefficient based on SDHASH similarity scores for the four
ransomware categories are shown in Table II. Here, for the
first WannaCry ransomware category, both clustering methods
are generating almost similar results; whereas, for the second
TABLE I
SILHOUETTE COEFFICIENT FOR FCM AND K-MEANS CLUTERING BASED ON SSDEEP SIMILARITY SCORES FOR RANSOMWARE CORPORA
Ransomware Clustering Cluster Size = 2 Cluster Size = 3 Cluster Size = 4 Cluster Size = 5 Cluster Size = 6 Cluster Size = 7
WannaCry K-Means Clustering 0.51 0.43 0.34 0.49 0.4 0.36
FCM Clustering 0.51 0.42 0.51 0.56 0.56 0.52
Locky K-Means Clustering 0.47 0.55 0.71 0.47 0.51 0.61
FCM Clustering 0.47 0.6 0.71 0.75 0.83 0.83
Cerber K-Means Clustering 0.36 0.29 0.46 0.71 0.45 0.41
FCM Clustering 0.36 0.51 0.46 0.57 0.69 0.65
CryptoWall K-Means Clustering 0.37 0.44 0.31 0.77 0.86 0.8
FCM Clustering 0.37 0.55 0.64 0.77 0.86 0.86
Locky ransomware category, FCM is generating improved
clustering results. However, for the last two Cerber and
CryptoWall ransomware categories, the results are inconsistent
and inconclusive for both FCM and k-means. Furthermore, the
important issue is all the values of Silhouette Coefficient are
quite low for both clustering methods, which reflects the poor
quality of clustering, irrespective of the underlying clustering
method. This may perhaps indicate the poor data quality (i.e.
insignificant similarity scores), generated by SDHASH fuzzy
hashing method. Overall, FCM clustering has still generated
better or similar clustering results in comparison to k-means
clustering with one major exception of Cerber ransomware
category. This reflects the natural alignment of the two fuzzy
methods may perhaps also dependent on the quality of data
(i.e. similarity scores).
IV. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION OF SSDEEP AND
SDHASH BASED FUZZY C-MEANS CLUSTERING RESULTS
The previous section demonstrated the slightly better perfor-
mance of the FCM clustering method in comparison with the
k-means clustering method. However, in the case of SDHASH,
the lower values of the average Silhouette Coefficient in two
ransomware categories Cerber and CryptoWall require further
investigation into their clustering results to gain more insight
into the clustering process and factors affecting it. Since
clustering is an unsupervised method and mostly evaluated by
internal metrics due the unavailability of standard class labels.
However, instead of using only one internal evaluation metric
which may not be sufficiently conclusive; here four metrics are
utilised for a rigorous evaluation of data and cluster quality
for both SSDEEP and SDHASH fuzzy hashing methods which
can lead to improvement of the proposed fuzzy approach.
The four evaluation metrics (particularly for FCM) Fuzzy
Silhouette Index (FHI), Partition Coefficient (PC), Modified
Partition Coefficient (MPC) and Partition Entropy (PE) are
implemented in fclust package of R [30]. The first three eval-
uation metrics FHI, PC and MPC, a higher value represents
improved clustering results and the last evaluation metric PE,
a lower value represents improved clustering results. For all
four selected ransomware categories, the values of all the
four metrics are computed for the range of clusters from
2 to 7 checking the quality and consistency of the FCM
clustering results based on all four metrics. This evaluation
was deemed necessary for two reasons: 1) verifying FCM
clustering results based on the comparative better value of all
the four evaluation metrics and selecting the optimal clustering
arrangement; and 2) verifying the optimal clustering result
generated by FCM (using SSDEEP/SDHASH) for all the four
ransomware categories with the optimal clustering result based
on the ground truth (which is derived manually from the
direct observation and thorough analysis of each ransomware
corpus).
A. Evaluation Metrics for SSDEEP based FCM Clustering
Results
Tables III to VI illustrate the evaluation metric results of
FCM clustering based on SSDEEP similarity scores for the
range of clusters from 2 to 7. In each result, the optimal
clustering arrangement was selected based on the overall
consideration of the four evaluation metrics. The optimal
clustering result of FCM for all the ransomware categories
WannaCry, Locky, Cerber and CryptoWall was verified with
the optimal clustering result based on the ground truth to
check whether it reflects the actual clustering arrangement
or not (see Table XI). The optimal clustering result of FCM
for the first WannaCry ransomware (i.e. cluster size = 2)
and last CryptoWall ransomware (i.e. cluster size = 6) are
verified as the actual clustering arrangements whereas the
other two results for the Locky and Cerber are different
from the actual clustering arrangements (i.e. cluster size = 3),
perhaps reflecting the issue of data (similarity scores) in these
clustering arrangements.
B. Evaluation Metrics for SDHASH based FCM Clustering
Results
Tables VII to X illustrate the evaluation metrics results of
FCM clustering based on SDHASH similarity scores for the
same range of clusters from 2 to 7. Similarly, in each result, the
optimal clustering arrangement was selected based on the over-
all consideration of the four evaluation metrics. In addition,
the optimal clustering result of FCM for all the ransomware
categories WannaCry, Locky, Cerber and CryptoWall was
again verified with the optimal clustering result based on the
ground truth to check whether it reflects the actual clustering
arrangement or not (see Table XI). The results are quite similar
to the previous SSDEEP results, where the optimal clustering
result of FCM for the first WannaCry ransomware (i.e. cluster
size = 2) and last CryptoWall ransomware (i.e. cluster size =
TABLE II
SILHOUETTE COEFFICIENT FOR FCM AND K-MEANS CLUTERING BASED ON SDHASH SIMILARITY SCORES FOR RANSOMWARE CORPORA
Ransomware Clustering Cluster Size = 2 Cluster Size = 3 Cluster Size = 4 Cluster Size = 5 Cluster Size = 6 Cluster Size = 7
WannaCry K-Means Clustering 0.84 0.85 0.84 0.34 0.5 0.52
FCM Clustering 0.85 0.85 0.84 0.85 0.5 0.52
Locky K-Means Clustering 0.38 0.39 0.34 0.5 0.5 0.53
FCM Clustering 0.38 0.49 0.55 0.56 0.56 0.56
Cerber K-Means Clustering 0.25 0.25 0.2 0.21 0.15 0.18FCM Clustering 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.25 0.26
CryptoWall K-Means Clustering 0.16 0.4 0.2 0.28 0.41 0.41
FCM Clustering 0.31 0.25 0.3 0.41 0.41 0.41
TABLE III
FCM CLUSTERING PERFORMANCE EVALUATION BASED ON SSDEEP FOR WANNACRY RANSOMWARE CORPUS
Performance Matrix Cluster Size = 2 Cluster Size = 3 Cluster Size = 4 Cluster Size = 5 Cluster Size = 6 Cluster Size = 7
Fuzzy Silhouette Index 0.7224137 0.7370338 0.7833303 0.7372618 0.7760049 0.7921996
Partition Coefficient 0.7501411 0.637614 0.6347659 0.6179419 0.6327981 0.6468907
Modified Partition Coefficient 0.5002822 0.456421 0.5130212 0.5224274 0.5593577 0.5880392
Partition Entropy 0.4026222 0.6397044 0.7175874 0.7998569 0.8224821 0.822943
TABLE IV
FCM CLUSTERING PERFORMANCE EVALUATION BASED ON SSDEEP FOR LOCKY RANSOMWARE CORPUS
Performance Matrix Cluster Size = 2 Cluster Size = 3 Cluster Size = 4 Cluster Size = 5 Cluster Size = 6 Cluster Size = 7
Fuzzy Silhouette Index 0.6340325 0.8188398 0.8780175 0.9149925 0.9401008 0.982355
Partition Coefficient 0.6614655 0.721327 0.7788498 0.8455779 0.8942035 0.8597256
Modified Partition Coefficient 0.322931 0.5819905 0.705133 0.8069724 0.8730442 0.8363466
Partition Entropy 0.5085802 0.5008109 0.4347904 0.3331637 0.2460767 0.3055177
TABLE V
FCM CLUSTERING PERFORMANCE EVALUATION BASED ON SSDEEP FOR CERBER RANSOMWARE CORPUS
Performance Matrix Cluster Size = 2 Cluster Size = 3 Cluster Size = 4 Cluster Size = 5 Cluster Size = 6 Cluster Size = 7
Fuzzy Silhouette Index 0.5833714 0.7339973 0.8002152 0.7285703 0.8659088 0.7798352
Partition Coefficient 0.6660919 0.6583039 0.6870257 0.5246157 0.7842891 0.8108148
Modified Partition Coefficient 0.3321837 0.4874558 0.5827009 0.4057697 0.7411469 0.7792839
Partition Entropy 0.5099735 0.6152036 0.6248182 0.9757595 0.477397 0.433583
6) are verified as the actual clustering arrangements whereas
the other two results for the Locky and Cerber are different
from the actual clustering arrangements (i.e. cluster size = 3),
perhaps again reflecting the issue of data (similarity scores)
in these clustering arrangements. Moreover, the evaluation
results for the ransomware categories Cerber and CryptoWall
are suboptimal and reflect relatively the lowest values of
evaluation metrics which may further affect the clustering
arrangements. After analysing the SDHASH results manually,
it was discovered that several SDHASH similarity scores were
trivial and in the range of 1 to 10%, this could have affected
the evaluation metrics and quality of clustering.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper proposed an efficient fuzzy analysis approach
to cluster ransomware based on the combination of two fuzzy
techniques: a fuzzy hashing method and fuzzy c-means (FCM)
clustering method. The analysis, in which a fuzzy hashing
method generates similarity scores for the unpacked ran-
somware corpus, then utilized by FCM to cluster ransomware
samples into similar groups without requiring an additional
transformational steps, obtaining distance amongst objects to
produce the clustering. Consequently, it reduces the computa-
tional overheads by utilising fuzzy similarity scores obtained
at the time of initial triaging of whether the sample is known or
unknown ransomware. The performance of the proposed fuzzy
method is compared against the k-means clustering method
based on the average Silhouette Coefficient for the range of
clusters from 2 to 7. This evaluation demonstrated a slightly
better performance of the FCM-based proposed fuzzy analysis
method in comparison with the k-means clustering method
with only a few exceptions. Later, the two fuzzy hashing
methods SSDEEP and SDHASH are evaluated based on their
FCM clustering results to understand how the similarity score
affects the clustering results. Interestingly, both fuzzy hashing
based clustering results are quite similar in terms of providing
the optimal clustering results. However, this evaluation found
some of the lowest values of performance metrics for the
SDHASH method, which indicated the poor data quality (i.e.
insignificant similarity scores). This was verified through the
TABLE VI
FCM CLUSTERING PERFORMANCE EVALUATION BASED ON SSDEEP FOR CRYPTOWALL RANSOMWARE CORPUS
Performance Matrix Cluster Size = 2 Cluster Size = 3 Cluster Size = 4 Cluster Size = 5 Cluster Size = 6 Cluster Size = 7
Fuzzy Silhouette Index 0.6150487 0.7675016 0.846787 0.9110777 0.953994 0.9869859
Partition Coefficient 0.5806928 0.6725729 0.735166 0.8633428 0.9181526 0.8835326
Modified Partition Coefficient 0.1613856 0.5088593 0.6468881 0.8291785 0.9017831 0.8641214
Partition Entropy 0.606458 0.5736678 0.5180916 0.2962557 0.1989172 0.2528264
TABLE VII
FCM CLUSTERING PERFORMANCE EVALUATION BASED ON SDHASH FOR WANNACRY RANSOMWARE CORPUS
Performance Matrix Cluster Size = 2 Cluster Size = 3 Cluster Size = 4 Cluster Size = 5 Cluster Size = 6 Cluster Size = 7
Fuzzy Silhouette Index 0.9738676 0.9178563 0.9108147 0.907304 0.6234609 0.6746477
Partition Coefficient 0.9535457 0.9623356 0.9719547 0.9822674 0.8657797 0.8642533
Modified Partition Coefficient 0.9370913 0.9435033 0.9626063 0.9718343 0.8389356 0.8416288
Partition Entropy 0.08731693 0.07931977 0.07089287 0.08797412 0.2449191 0.2708055
TABLE VIII
FCM CLUSTERING PERFORMANCE EVALUATION BASED ON SDHASH FOR LOCKY RANSOMWARE CORPUS
Performance Matrix Cluster Size = 2 Cluster Size = 3 Cluster Size = 4 Cluster Size = 5 Cluster Size = 6 Cluster Size = 7
Fuzzy Silhouette Index 0.6566241 0.7355261 0.8044129 0.9636842 0.964037 0.9643856
Partition Coefficient 0.5 0.6255529 0.6413573 0.5875071 0.5420436 0.5080622 0.4814996
Modified Partition Coefficient — 0.4383293 0.5218098 0.4843838 0.4504524 0.4260726
Partition Entropy 0.6931472 0.6633887 0.7031208 0.8353462 0.9756238 1.101317
TABLE IX
FCM CLUSTERING PERFORMANCE EVALUATION BASED ON SDHASH FOR CERBER RANSOMWARE CORPUS
Performance Matrix Cluster Size = 2 Cluster Size = 3 Cluster Size = 4 Cluster Size = 5 Cluster Size = 6 Cluster Size = 7
Fuzzy Silhouette Index 0.4015527 0.6113267 0.6031268 0.255693 0.6966099 0.7795199
Partition Coefficient 0.5 0.3333333 0.25 0.2 0.2220473 0.2795594
Modified Partition Coefficient — — — — 0.06645678 0.1594859
Partition Entropy 0.6931472 1.098612 1.386294 1.609438 1.65455 1.605168
analysis of the SDHASH results manually. It was discovered
that several SDHASH similarity scores are trivial and in the
range of 1 to 10%, this could have affected the evaluation
metrics and quality of clustering.
For future improvements, it is important to evaluate the pro-
posed method with a threshold value of the similarity scores
to establish the effect of these similarity scores and further
enhance the fuzzy hashing algorithm itself, thus increasing the
clustering performance of FCM. This proposed fuzzy analysis
approach could be automated by generating sparse fuzzy rules
based on the best results of FCM [31] and employing an
adaptive fuzzy rule interpolation technique [32], [33], [34],
[35]. Moreover, this sparse fuzzy rule base can be updated
dynamically by employing dynamic fuzzy rule interpolation
(D-FRI) method [36], [37], [38], [39], [40], [41], [42]. After
further enhancing and automating this fuzzy analysis approach,
it can be tested in different security frameworks [43].
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